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Abstract
This paper examines the shortcomings of Western academia’s coverage of the
Guomindang’s decision to breach the Yellow River dikes in 1938. The catastrophe is discussed
in individual segments by many in Western academia and lacks a comprehensive view of the
event, which this paper will provide. Flood waters inundated the plains of the Henan, Anhui, and
Kiangsu provinces, killing hundreds of thousands of people, and creating a massive refugee
crisis. The lack of arable land and labor, the damaged agricultural infrastructure, and a major
drought led to the Henan Famine of 1942-1943 which killed millions more. After Japan’s
surrender in 1945, considerable effort was made to plug the breach with substantial international
support in the form of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The repair
effort was steeped in politics as a civil war between the Guomindang and the Communists
erupted. When the breach was repaired, it flooded refugee settlements relocated into the old
riverbed. Frustrated with how they had been treated, the people of northern China assisted the
communists in their defeat of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. This research consisted of primary and
secondary source material that was available through online archives. The United Nations
archives were utilized to acquire the monthly reports regarding the repair of the breach. Included
in the study is a report from the Chief Engineer of the repair which contained a map of the
flooded areas. To supplement these sources, newspaper and magazine articles were obtained
from the ProQuest Historical Newspapers archive.

Common Acronyms
UNRRA: United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
CCP: Chinese Communist Party
GMD: Guomindang or Chinese Nationalist Party
CNRRA: Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
CLARA: Chinese Liberated Areas Relief Association
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Introduction
Japan’s invasion of China in 1937 marked the start of a long and brutal war that lasted for
eight years. It was only ended by the brutal use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and
the USSR breaking the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact by invading Manchuria. These dramatic
events prompted Emperor Hirohito to finally agree to a complete surrender of Japan. Along the
way, there were many tragedies on the Eastern Front, including the Rape of Nanjing, the attack
on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the fire bombings of Tokyo (1944-1945), and the Sandakan Death
Marches (1942-1945) but one event in particular has been glossed over by Western academia for
decades: the intentional flooding of the Yellow River.
In a desperate effort to halt the Japanese army from reaching the temporary capital setup
in modern day Wuhan, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Guomindang otherwise
known as the Nationalist Party (GMD), that had united China just ten years prior, ordered the
breaching of the dikes that contained the Yellow River. The river poured out and bought the
GMD five months of time to move the government to Chungking but it also devastated the
countryside for eight years. The citizens were caught off guard by the overflowing river and
hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed, with millions more becoming refugees within
days. The situation only grew worse as the war with Japan prevented any real effort of plugging
the breach until fighting had stopped. Henan was particularly impacted as the floods created
ideal conditions for a famine which from 1942-1943 killed several million people. Refugees fled
in droves, but the GMD could hardly support them as they struggled to resist the Japanese army.
While World War II raged on, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) slowly gained
strength in Northern China, setting the stage for a civil war. When Japan finally surrendered in
1945, plans had already been developed by the newly formed United Nations Relief and
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Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the GMD to repair the damage to the dikes and
tame the Yellow River. The CCP agreed to participate at first, but no amount of mediation could
keep the GMD and CCP from fighting. The civil war was tied intimately to the Yellow River
Project as a propaganda battle was fought over who was to blame and what should happen to the
refugees who had moved into the northern riverbed, an issue that was never truly resolved.
Chiang launched the “Strong Point Offensive” in January 1947, hoping to end the civil war but
severely miscalculated the reaction from the people of northern China. The closing of the breach
in March, and subsequent flooding of the people living in and around the northern riverbed,
angered many in the North who would later help CCP forces defeat Chiang’s main army.
Capitalizing on this victory, the CCP continued to march south until the GMD fled to Taiwan
and the People’s Republic of China was established.
The flooding of the Yellow River had consequences that branched out like tributaries,
culminating into the CCP seizing power. All of these events are connected and feed off of one
another but Western academia largely focuses on particular aspects of the disaster, instead of
capturing the totality of this monumental event. It is not enough to talk about the casualties
caused by the flooding when millions more died in the famine it later caused. It is not enough to
discuss the Henan Famine when the flooding and the famine contributed greatly to the GMD’s
downfall. It is not enough to focus exclusively on the civil war and ignore how the floods and
famine drove the citizens of China into the CCP’s arms. Through examining the web of
consequences that breaching the Yellow River dike had, it becomes clear that the breach
completely reshaped Chinese history and deserves to be viewed through that lens.
Methodology
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I have analyzed UNRRA monthly reports, The UNRRA’s Chief Engineer, O.J. Todd’s
maps and reports, and English language newspaper articles from China, Japan, and the United
States. The UNRRA reports give insight into the political issues that afflicted the repair effort.
They were only one side of the story, but a particularly insightful one as they give details on
conversations between officials of the CCP, UNRRA, and GMD. The mission in China was not
restricted to just the Yellow River Project so these reports provide economic data, political
analysis, military analysis, and portray the general attitude of UNRRA officials to the Chinese
National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA) and the Guomindang.
O.J. Todd’s records from his mission to repair the dikes provides invaluable written
accounts and maps of the area affected by the floods. Todd’s expertise from working on the
rivers and dikes in China for almost twenty years before World War II is helpful for determining
what happened and where, but he shows clear bias by excluding anything that would be even
remotely considered political from his work. In “The Yellow River Reharnessed,” Todd details
the Yellow River’s history of flooding as well as the repair effort performed by the UNRRA.1 He
specifically does not mention why the flood occurred and only mentions the CNRRA twice
throughout the twenty-page article and never mentions the CCP. To fill in this gap, I will
supplement this with news articles from China and the United States, which shift from apolitical
to clearly political. These articles provide key coverage of the politics and propaganda that was
used during this tumultuous time.
Historiography
English language scholarly work on the Yellow River was largely absent until 2001 when
Diana Lary published “Drowned Earth: The Strategic Breaching of the Yellow River Dike,

1

Oliver J. Todd, "The Yellow River Reharnessed," Geographical Review 39, no. 1 (1949).

4

1938.”2 Lary’s article concludes with a critique of Western academia for failing to study this
event in detail.3 Lary later expanded on this topic in the chapter “The Waters Covered the Earth:
China’s War-Induced Natural Disasters” of War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan,
and the Asia Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century” (2004), which expands slightly on how this
catastrophe is also tied to the Henan Famine on 1942-1943.4 Since then, other scholars like Rana
Mitter, Kathryn Edgerton Tarpley, and Micah Mucolino have emerged to largely agree with
Lary, branching out slightly but never exploring the entirety of this event.
Lary’s article and chapter are remarkably similar, using much of the same language and
research. “Drowned Earth” is focused exclusively on the breach while “The Waters Covered the
Earth” analyzes the event in comparison to other acts of environmental warfare. One of the key
purposes of each piece is simply to describe the event due to how little it had been written about
at the time. The main difference between them is that “The Waters Covered the Earth” expands
on the link to the Henan Famine of 1942-1943, but still only loosely linking the river’s role to the
famine through the refugee crisis and the environmental damage it caused.5 Lary’s work provides
insight into the strategic thinking that went into breaching the dike and how it was done.6 She
also gives details on the casualties and refugees from the Second Historical Archives of China,
which are inaccessible outside of China.7 These records are the only official attempt at counting
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the casualties but are heavily disputed as part of the propaganda battle that the GMD and CCP
engaged in during the civil war between 1945 and 1949.8
Lary’s contentions are supported by more recent scholarly work. Kathryn EdgertonTarpley, the author of “Between War and Water: Farmer, City, and State in China’s Yellow
River Flood of 1938–1947” tells the story of the plight of refugees and the immediate political
consequences of the disaster.9 Micah Muscolino uses “Violence Against the People and the
Land: The Environment and Refugee Migration from China’s Henan Province, 1938-1945" to
further link the flooding and refugee crisis to the Henan Famine.10 This analysis drastically alters
the casualty estimates from hundreds of thousands to millions when including the famine. Where
the sources start to differ is that Lary tends to view the repair effort as a success while further
research has shown that it was full of infighting and strife between the UNRRA and the GMD.
Authors like Rana Mitter in Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-1945 and ”Imperialism,
Transnationalism, and the Reconstruction of Post-war China: UNRRA in China 1944-7”
describes some of the issues that plagued the repair and reveal stark ideological differences that
further eroded the western powers support for the GMD.11 Edgerton-Tarpley also contributes “A
River Runs through It: The Yellow River and The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1947,” which delves
deep into how the propaganda battle was waged over the Yellow River and how that turned the
tide of the civil war in favor of the CCP.12 These works are all excellent at exploring certain
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aspects of the flood but all of them limit themselves with arbitrary cutoff dates or by focusing
exclusively on one aspect. The breaching of the Yellow River is still relevant today and a
comprehensive examination of the event and its consequences are needed.
Background
The Yellow River is known as the “Cradle of Chinese Civilization” for it runs through
heart of the country and is used to irrigate the plains that feed millions.13 It has another identity
as well that highlights the dual roles of the river: China’s Sorrow. The Yellow River is a wildly
unpredictable force of nature that for centuries has been tied to governmental legitimacy. When
the dikes were not maintained and a major flood occurred, the Yellow River acted as a harbinger
of a regime change. Any change in the river’s course had an overarching effect on the whole
nation, and the flooding in 1938 is certainly no exception to the rule. Chiang Kai-shek was well
aware of this and initially did invest in maintaining the dike system when he and the GMD came
to power in 1928, even while throwing most of the nation’s other resources towards fighting the
CCP. Eventually, the threat of Japan was too great, and the bitter rivals forged an uneasy alliance
to fight Japan over any further territorial gains.
War started with Japan after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937, when the
Japanese demanded to be able to search for a missing soldier inside the Chinese town of
Wanping, which the Chinese refused.14 A small skirmish broke out and both the Japanese and
Chinese governments used it to stoke up nationalism. Eventually, the Japanese invaded, rapidly
taking most of the coast and, shortly thereafter, the capital of Nanjing by December 1937. The
GMD setup a new capital in present day Wuhan, but it was not long before that too was under
threat. Chiang Kai-shek decided that the dike system containing the Yellow River could be
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breached to “use water as a substitute for soldiers.”15 On June 9, 1938, GMD soldiers worked
with shovels and pickaxes to breach the dikes near Huayuankou, a small Chinese town in Henan,
unleashing environmental warfare on the Japanese soldiers, but more so on the unsuspecting
Chinese citizens in the river’s wake.16 Waters poured out of the breach and decimated the Henan
region before moving into Anhui and, finally, Jiangsu where it reached the Grand Canal that
mercifully poured into the ocean (Figure 1).

Figure 1: The shaded areas indicate the flooding caused by the breach.17

Diana Lary, China’s Republic, New Approaches to Asian History, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge
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The GMD made a choice not to warn the villages and towns that the river banks would
soon wash away, hoping instead to maintain the element of surprise against the Japanese
soldiers. Ultimately, the decision to not warn the citizens of the incoming floods might not have
been one out of malice, but instead it may have partially been due to a lack of communication
technology in the area as radios and telegram poles were not widespread at the time.18 Either
way, no attempt was made. Seeing as how the GMD hoped to blame Japan for the catastrophe
and providing a warning would have tipped their hand, it would seem to be that Chiang viewed
the peasants of China as fodder to maintain his power, which I will expand upon later in this
paper. Immediately after the breach, the GMD made a short film of soldiers pretending to try and
close the gap after a Japanese bomber flew by the area.19 Between this and the massacre in
Nanjing in 1937, the GMD hoped to drum up international support and pressure against Japan.
The problem was that it was not believable that Japan would jeopardize their own military
objectives by flooding the easiest route to the GMD’s capital. The international community
might have been sympathetic to China because of the Japanese military’s appalling actions in
other areas of China, but within months it was widely understood that Japan was not responsible
for the floods.20
The flood waters followed a predictable course but because there was no warning, it still
resulted in horrendous casualties. Just how many died is a matter of debate. During the war, the
GMD estimated that twelve million people were affected by the flood.21 The flooded area was
contested territory so obtaining accurate numbers ranged from difficult to impossible.
Regardless, the GMD used this as part of a propaganda effort to show the sacrifice that Chinese
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people were enduring to stop Japan. After the war, in 1948, they updated the number of
casualties to 846,000; however, this number is disputed.22 The CCP released figures in 1952 that
put the death toll at 470,000 but upped that number in 1972 to almost 900,000, which was more
of an attack on the GMD than a reasonable estimate.23 Many contemporary scholars believe that
the total was likely closer to 400,000, still a horrendous loss of life but not as catastrophic.
Steven Dutch, however, uses two studies on predicting flood casualties to prove that the original
estimate from 1948 is plausible.24 The truth is that we will never know the full extent of the
Yellow River’s destruction due to a lack of primary sources but even the most conservative of
estimates make this a remarkable tragedy.
World War II created hordes of refugees worldwide but no single action created a refugee
crisis like breaching the Yellow River dikes. Millions of people were left without homes as entire
villages were destroyed by the seemingly endless waters.25 The flooding continued for eight and
a half years, and while the people tried to adapt to the new course, it was a daunting task. Most
chose to leave the area, either moving into the old riverbed, or fleeing to the west, hoping for
some kind of relief from the GMD. They were met by a cold and calculating government that
consistently tried to use the catastrophe to their advantage. The GMD and CCP operated press
opted to refer to refugees as “refugee compatriots or disaster victim compatriots” and viewed
their sacrifice as “a sacrifice borne for the nation.”26 Many refugees were relocated to server as
labor for the massive farms that were required to feed the rapidly growing population in the new
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capital of Chongqing or conscripted into military service.27 However, the refugees who tried to
stay in the flooded area were subjected to a far more deadly experience: famine.
Henan Famine
The Yellow River is historically an unpredictable river because, during the heavy flows
of the summer, it drags massive silt deposits with it that raise the riverbed up, making the
surrounding area more susceptible to flooding.28 The dike system normally contained most of the
silt to the main riverbed and was occasionally dredged to ensure the river was less of a flood risk.
However, with virtually no government in effective control of the flooded area, the silt was no
longer contained to just the riverbed, and overflowed into the surrounding farmland which then
froze during the winter. Planting seeds in the spring became difficult, if not impossible, in the
floodplains. O.J. Todd reported in 1949 that “nearly two million acres of good farmland…had
been partly or entirely taken out of dependable production.”29 The floods, originating in Henan,
made the province the most susceptible to the destruction. As a result, the majority of refugees
and deaths came from this region, but with no relief in sight, only more tragedy was coming.
Many people left the area in search of food, not knowing that there was none to be found.
Henan, like many rural areas in China, relied on intricately and meticulously maintained
man-made landscapes to maximize agricultural production with limited technology. The land is
particularly flat so when the waters came, there were few places to hide, and much of the land
was rendered useless. Micah Muscolino estimates that “flooding inundated 32 per cent of the
fields in Eastern Henan and deposited approximately 100,000,000 tons of silt.”30 What the water
did not destroy, the silt rendered useless. To make matters worse, those lucky enough to avoid
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the waters and flee were slowly trampling the land they had worked so hard to cultivate and were
unable to provide the needed labor to help recover from the floods. This, combined with a
particularly hot and dry period, as well as governmental policies from both Japan and the GMD,
culminated in the Henan Famine of 1942-1943.
Henan suffered greatly during the war and received no respite from the weather. Despite
the influx of water from the Yellow River, Henan began experiencing drought conditions
beginning in 1938 and lasting until 1945.31 This was not particularly abnormal but could not
have come at a worse time for the region. Already the usable farmland had been drastically
reduced and what areas could be farmed suddenly found themselves in need of water. The
drought had another important implication; the dried northern riverbed provided ideal breeding
ground for locusts which would emerge in 1942, migrating south and ruining the crops in the fall
1942 and spring 1943.32 Conditions had become dire, and this did not happen in a vacuum, as the
war with Japan was constantly draining supplies from the area. In 1940, a poor harvest prompted
the GMD to establish a grain tax, something the Japanese were already doing in the section of
Henan they nominally ruled, placing a greater burden on the peasantry of China.33 Henan
buckled under the pressure, resulting in a devastating famine.
The Henan famine is most famously described in English by the Times Magazine
journalist, Theodore White:
[I saw] dogs eating human bodies by the roads, peasants seeking dead human flesh under
the cover of darkness, endless deserted villages, beggars swarming at every city gate,
babies abandoned to cry and die on every highway. Nothing can transmit the horror of the
entire great famine in Honan [Henan] Province.34
Anthony Garnaut, “A Quantitative Description of the Henan Famine of 1942,” Modern Asian Studies 47, no. 6
(2013): 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24494213.
32
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33
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34
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http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,796097-1,00.html.
31
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Most estimates on the death toll of the famine are around three million, but there are no official
records to verify this number.35 Many more residents of the region fled the area on trains or on
foot in search of food, or simply to escape the living nightmare of the time. Those who stayed
could be enlisted by the GMD to attempt to repair new breaks in the Yellow River dike system or
conscripted into the army.36 Others, as White describes, found increasingly desperate ways to
survive. Those who managed to survive these harrowing experiences were relieved in 1944 by a
better crop yield spurred by moderate rains in 1943.37 While drought conditions returned in 1944,
1945 brought an end to their torment as rain returned and Japan surrendered to the Allies.
Repair and Politics
In 1943, the tide began to turn in World War II as Germany’s offensive in Russia failed
and the United States began reversing Japan’s gains in the Pacific. The Allies realized that they
would need a plan to address the massive, global reconstruction effort required when the war
ended. One organization that emerged from this idea was the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration. The UNRRA was a global organization and contributed to the
repair efforts in Europe, Africa, and Asia. One of its missions was to repair the dikes of the
Yellow River and rehabilitate the inundated farmland. This project was of particular interest
because it could increase the global food supply by “two million tons annually,” which the
famine-wracked people of China sorely needed.38 By many measures, this mission can be viewed
as a success as the repair was completed in a mere thirteen months. Beneath the surface,
however, it was tied deeply to the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the
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Guomindang that ended in 1949, was associated with GMD corruption, and undermined the
United Nations and United States’ reputation with the CCP.
By the end of World War II, the breach had expanded to be a mile wide, with many other
parts of the dike system also dilapidated after of eight years without maintenance. The UNRRA
knew that to tackle a repair of this magnitude they would need to rely on someone with extensive
knowledge of the area. They chose O.J. Todd, an American who worked in China for years
before the outbreak of war, studying the rivers, dikes, irrigation, and flood conditions.39 While
Todd was not publicly interested in the politics, his experience in the region made him a suitable
candidate to work with GMD officials on the project. Massive amounts of labor were needed for
the repair effort, so the UNRRA conscripted locals by paying them with imported grain
distributed by the GMD’s counterpart to the UNRRA, the Chinese National Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA).40
Work began in early 1946 but immediately ran into transportation issues as the war with
Japan and the Yellow River’s floods had destroyed many roads, railways, and bridges.41 The
mood was optimistic nonetheless as a ceasefire was signed on January 10, 1946, and even the so
called “bandits” who operated in uncontrolled areas were cooperative with the CNRRA and
UNRRA personnel.42 That optimism did not last long as it became clear that the ceasefire would
not hold. By March, open warfare was underway, and some trends began to emerge. The first
was that the transportation issue was going to be a consistent problem for operations. It was such
an issue that CNRRA vehicles would travel with equipment to build temporary roads and bridges
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to pass some areas before dismantling them after crossing so that they could be used again later
on the trip.43 That hints at another problem that plagued the CNRRA: complete disorganization.
Part of the problem was that the CNRRA was a newly formed organization that had not
settled all of its leadership positions.44 Other difficulties were related to a lack of training on the
complex equipment, a lack of reliable communication methods, and labor shortages.45 The
CNRRA was meant to be an apolitical institution that only sought to assist any Chinese
community in need, but that goal quickly deteriorated as the civil war went on. The UNRRA
monthly reports all point out issues with deliveries to communist controlled territories until
finally in December 1946 they blatantly called the CNRRA’s distribution “discriminatory.”46
Finances were also a sore point between the organizations. The UNRRA provided vehicles,
medical supplies, food, and other materials with specific stipulations on what could and could
not be sold by the CNRRA. In May 1946, it was discovered that despite not having enough
trucks to deliver supplies, the CNRRA was selling virtually any that the UNRRA supplied to pay
off debts.47 While vehicles were permitted to be sold, it was meant to be in instances of excess
supplies, not to fund the agency. Food was specifically banned from being sold but in January
1947, they broke that rule as well.48 Financial issues were not just limited to the CNRRA as the
GMD struggled to keep the economy afloat while the civil war continued.
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Despite these obstacles, the Yellow River Project continued to make progress until the
CCP began to protest in March 1946. The issue at hand was that the northern riverbed in the
Shantung province was now home to over one hundred villages and five hundred thousand
people.49 If work was to continue, the people would need to be compensated for their losses and
relocated, and repairs to the dikes in Shantung needed to be completed before the main breach at
Huayuankou was repaired. This was not necessarily new information as Todd had noted earlier
in January that these would need to be repaired, but he had hoped it could be done
simultaneously.50 The problem was that so few supplies had been shipped by the CNRRA to
Shantung that work was not progressing fast enough. Frustrated communist troops who felt that
the river’s return threatened their people acted independently to sabotage equipment and kidnap
fifteen UNRRA workers near Huayuankou.51 While the CCP’s top diplomat, Zhou Enlai, was
able to assist in the workers’ safe return, it was clear that resistance was building against the
project.
In April the “Oral Agreement” was made between the Zhou Enlai, O.J. Todd, and
Franklin Ray Jr., the Acting Director to the UNRRA’s China Office, which would delay the
breach closure until repairs were completed in Shantung.52 The lack of CNRRA and GMD
representation is notable here as work continued on the main breach with the goal of beating the
high-water season in late July. At the same time, the GMD initiated a blockade of all communist
controlled ports, severely limiting the supplies that the UNRRA could provide to the dike
workers in northern Henan and Shantung.53 In preparation of the return of the Yellow River to its
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northern course, the CCP mobilized over 380,000 workers in Shantung to repair the dike system,
despite not having the necessary supplies.54 This mobilization effort showcased the CCP’s ability
to inspire the peasants of China and would be a tactic that they would use again to turn the tide of
the civil war.
The valiant effort put forth to repair the Shantung dikes before the floods arrived was
unsuccessful, but the northern Chinese were spared by early rains that stopped work on the main
breach at Huayuankou.55 Those in the path of the southern course would have to endure the river
for another year. Negotiations between Zhou, the CNRRA, and the UNRRA reaffirmed the
stance that residents in the northern riverbed would need to be compensated and relocated, with
the GMD pledging fifteen billion yuan, the dominant currency in China, to that end.56 To address
the issue of supplies not reaching workers in communist controlled areas, Zhou requested formal
representation in the CNRRA, a request that was quickly rejected. At this point, the UNRRA
reports began to broadcast skepticism that cooperation between the GMD and CCP was possible
and became far more critical of both the GMD and the CNRRA which included condemning
GMD assassinations and CNRRA incompetence.57 The civil war was intensifying into open
warfare, and safety concerns were becoming a priority for the organization.
Work on the Yellow River Project was limited to maintenance of existing structures until
the waters subsided in late October 1946. Part of the trestle had been washed away by the waters
in July but worse than that, the waters surprisingly eroded the riverbed instead of depositing
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enough silt to raise the bed, like it traditionally had done in the past.58 This meant that a new dike
would have to be constructed further up the river to contain the waters while they repaired the
main breach. Fighting over the train station near Huayuankou only exacerbated the existing
supply issues and Chiang’s “Order 86” in July for the military to assist UNRRA/CNRRA
deliveries had no effect.59 Franc Shor, an Executive Officer for the UNRRA, admitted that the
“minor hurdles appear endless” in his December report but also speculated that the Yellow River
Project could be completed in January and that the northern dikes could possibly handle “low
and medium stages” of the river but were not yet ready for the high flood stages of the summer.60
The CCP disagreed and pointed out that none of the fifteen billion yuan had been provided to the
northern bed residents, which at this point was worth less than half of what it was when the
promise was made in July.61
This brings up a chronic issue that the GMD faced during this time as the economy
continuously sank deeper and deeper into a hole. By December 1946, the cost of living in
Shanghai had increased over six hundred percent from January.62 Maintaining a massive army
which boasted over three million soldiers while attempting to repair the damage that eight years
of war with Japan had caused was proving to be a bigger and costlier task than the government
was prepared for.63 Part of the problem was rampant corruption throughout the government and
while this issue is not specific to the Yellow River Project, it is worth pointing out how it
damaged the UNRRA’s relationship with the government. In March 1946, the UNRRA reported
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that in Henan “levies on food stock by the military and government authorities in various
sections to keep the armies in the field further drains the slender supply.”64 In April, these tactics
evolved into GMD soldiers confiscating UNRRA flour from workers with little to no
compensation.65 The UNRRA officially complained in May that the CNRRA Waterway
Transport division still had no funds and the only staff were UNRRA workers on loan and in
June, its partner, the CNRRA Highway Transport division, was under investigation for
corruption.66 This, in combination with the CNRRA selling the UNRRA needed supplies, paints
a fairly clear picture of the GMD taking advantage of the UNRRA and the UNRRA knowing it.
Tension was palpable on the Yellow River Project as Todd, usually apolitical in his work
and writing about China, openly criticized the GMD for failing to pay the residents in the
northern bed on January 7, 1947.67 Another issue emerged with the repair that caused a shift in
tactics to build an earthen mound to reinforce the dike and would delay the closure until March.68
Between the pressure from Todd, the CCP, and the delay, the GMD agreed to meet in February
to sort through the issues. On February 7, the GMD released the funds and agreed to only
complete the closure when all parties, the Chinese Liberated Area Relief Association (CLARA),
UNRRA, and CNRRA, agreed and the northern dike system had been repaired.69 The GMD,
however, had no intention of following through with this and continued to focus on the main
breach. This could have been because Chiang Kai-shek was desperate to restore legitimacy to his
government through the Yellow River, but he also had military reasons for wanting the breach
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closed. Chiang believed that by reverting the river to its old course that he would isolate a
prominent CCP force and be able to reclaim Northern China from the CCP.70 In March, the
UNRRA reacted to the deception by pulling their personnel from the project because the
northern dikes were still in disrepair and the people had not yet been relocated from the old
bed.71 By this point, it was too late, and the breach was closed on March 15, 1947. The original
mission was a success but the only group that was happy with the results was the GMD.
Despite all of these issues, it is an incredible achievement to have repaired such a massive
gap in a little over a year’s time. One massive benefit was that people could return to farming,
providing themselves and the country with an extremely important food supply. However, the
GMD’s hasty effort to close the gap once again excluded warning those in the Yellow River’s
path. The water swept away many villages but since it was not the high-water season, it killed
hundreds of people as opposed to the hundreds of thousands, and created a fraction of the
number of refugees from the previous crisis.72 The operation certainly can be viewed as a
technical success but classifying it as such ignores the workers who were not paid because of
their ideology and the people who were left homeless by the Yellow River’s return. These people
were not just pawns in the grand strategy of the civil war like the GMD thought. The CCP knew
how to mobilize their resentment, and the resentment of the people who were originally flooded,
into action that would define the civil war.
Legacy
By breaching the dikes of the Yellow River, the Guomindang betrayed their citizens and
the very notion of governmental legitimacy that had been upheld in China for centuries. Many
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citizens likely did not know or did not care who was responsible for making the initial breach,
but they did know who was supposed to help them through and end the catastrophe. Even the
attempts that the GMD made to provide relief were self-serving and militaristic in nature. When
it came time to remedy the situation, the government ignored its northern citizen’s desires for a
potential military advantage. These actions all added up to significant distrust and disinterest in
the GMD’s political machinations.
When the repair effort started, GMD officials hoped that restoring the river would
reaffirm their legitimacy as they faced the prospect of civil war against the CCP. This hope,
however, was ill-founded as the suffering that the citizens had endured was not so easily
forgotten and returning things to normal was viewed as more of a responsibility that the
government owed them than something that would generate any goodwill.73 To make the GMD’s
job of winning over the people of China harder was the fact that the CCP had considerably more
experience actually doing it. The CCP had survived for years through guerilla tactics and peasant
support.74 They knew the people better because they were forced to by the GMD’s army hunting
them while they fled through China’s vast countryside to Yenan in 1934. From there they waged
guerilla warfare against Japan for eight years, earning the respect of the rural populace, only to
continue these tactics against the GMD.75
In addition, there was a strong anti-colonial sentiment among China’s populace and the
“go it alone” message that the CCP broadcast was especially appealing. This stemmed from the
Century of Humiliation (Bainian guochi) where western powers took advantage of China’s
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isolationist past through a series of unequal treaties, wars, and colonization.76 In contrast, the
GMD was tied heavily to foreign support, particularly the United States which had maintained a
military presence in China until January 1947.77 The CCP made a point to consistently attack this
connection throughout the civil war. A breaking point was reached in December when a US
Marine raped a woman in Beijing, sparking national outrage. After water was released into the
northern riverbed to make repairs on the main breach easier, a pro-communist newspaper
compared the event to the December rape.78 That spelled the end of direct US involvement in
China for several decades.
Even after the US navy left, it was a common belief that the UNRRA was little more than
a puppet of the US government, an association that severely damaged the organization’s
reputation in the Shantung province. In October 1946, the UNRRA informed Zhou Enlai of this
and asked for assistance but only received assurances that CCP officials knew the difference.79
For what it is worth, there was significant evidence to link the UNRRA and the US together,
especially in northern China. The organization was largely funded by the US, the first delivery of
UNRRA supplies to the region was performed by the US Navy in January, and, because of the
military situation, many of the supplies after that were delivered via US airlifts.80 In agreeing to
work solely through the CNRRA and neglecting CLARA, the UNRRA made a political decision
as well. The UNRRA’s mission was to provide apolitical aid but it certainly felt political to the
dike workers who were never paid because of where they lived. Tensions rose to the point that a
UNRRA worker was murdered near Beijing by a communist and sixty-three dike workers were
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killed in February 1947, which led to the cancellation of the UNRRA inspecting the northern
dikes.81 Animosity towards the international community continued after the CCP came to power
in 1949 as well, and while this cannot be completely contributed to the Yellow River, it certainly
did not help.
Perhaps the most dramatic showcase of the breach’s legacy, however, was its role in
overthrowing the Guomindang. With the UNRRA unwilling to send personnel or supplies to the
north in February, the CCP again displayed their talent for mobilizing the masses. Concerned
about the high-water season, four hundred thousand workers took up repairs on the “The
People’s Dike,” not for money but simply to save their homes.82 Self-preservation was a strong
rallying cry used by the communists in later years and was effective because it was originally
formed out of necessity. While “The People’s Dike” did not completely contain the Yellow
River, there were very few casualties from the flooding, and it was regarded as a moral victory
for the people of China.83 Without expensive equipment or training, the people of China working
together could seemingly accomplish anything.
Chiang Kai-shek viewed the rerouting of the Yellow River as a way to isolate two major
communist armies so that they could be more easily eliminated and bring an end to the civil war.
He was correct that the closure would have an outsized impact on the war, but he was wrong on
how. The river was meant to be a natural barrier that could protect the southern flank of the
“Strong Point Offensive,” a concentration of the GMD’s elite forces in Shantung that would use
a massive pincer maneuver to conquer the North. The first pincer was meant to capture Yan’an,
which, while successful, the CCP had largely abandoned in early 1947 in anticipation of this
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move.84 The river’s role in the war, however, was not over. Mirroring the mobilization effort for
the construction of “The People’s Dike,” the Jin-Ji-Yu-Lu field army worked with locals to
construct ferries and cross the Yellow River.85 The southern flank was exposed, and on May 16,
1947, the GMD was dealt a stunning defeat at the Battle of Menglianggu.86 The GMD’s armies
were then cut off, isolated, and overextended. The CCP capitalized on this momentum, marching
continuously south and by 1949, Chiang and the GMD had fled to Taiwan.
Conclusion
Controlling the Yellow River has always been tied to the right to rule in China. Chiang
Kai-shek thought that breaching the dike was a new way of controlling the river for military
purposes, but this unique version of scorched earth tactics was far more harmful to their own
people than to their enemies. In The Generalisimo, a study of Chiang Kai-shek’s personal
diaries, Jay Taylor writes, “Chiang no doubt saw the sacrifice as warranted in the context of a
war for the survival of Chinese Civilization, a war in which there would be many rivers of blood,
but he also showed no private remorse, not mentioning the event in his diary.”87 The goal for a
long defensive war was achieved but at the cost of millions of innocent lives; it is beyond
deplorable. As the refugees arrived from the flooded region, the GMD sought new ways to take
advantage of these people through forced labor and military service. The war with Japan exposed
many of the fundamental flaws with Guomindang leadership, but the breach of the Yellow River
dikes broadcasted the worst flaw for a government to have: the complete disregard for its people.
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The Yellow River had the worst effect in Henan as the people were given no warning of
the incoming floods. The flat landscape offered nowhere to escape for those in the immediate
path, but those who were lucky enough to survive the initial onslaught were only subjected to
more horrors. The intricate agricultural system in the plains of China required constant
maintenance, but as the survivors fled the area, they destroyed these landscapes and eliminated
the crucial labor needed to rebuild them. The destruction of so much land left the government
desperate for food to feed its massive army, so it established a grain tax on the drought-stricken
people. Locusts nesting in the old riverbed migrated south to make a bad situation even worse,
culminating in a terrible famine that created millions more refugees and casualties. The breach
created cascading impacts on this region that the people would not soon forget.
After Japan’s surrender, Chiang Kai-shek secured international support through the
UNRRA who hoped to remain apolitical despite obvious signs of a civil war brewing.
Ultimately, the political climate made the UNRRA and USA’s ties to the GMD inherently
political. The UNRRA agreed to operate solely through the GMD’s new organization, the
CNRRA, which consistently mismanaged supplies and at times outright refused deliveries to the
north. Repairs were needed on the northern dikes in Shantung, but the GMD opted to ignore the
people again and closed the breach in March 1947, flooding the inhabitants who had moved into
the old riverbed again. Chiang believed that this would restore governmental legitimacy and lead
to a military operation that would finally end the civil war. Instead, the people turned against
him, helping communist forces ford the river and destroy the GMD’s elite forces in Shantung.
The citizens of northern China did not assist the CCP simply because of the initial floods,
or the famine, or the second floods; they did it for all of these reasons. When the breach was
plugged, it appeared that the GMD would prevail over the CCP in the struggle for China, but this
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was unacceptable to the citizens who had survived the devastating crisis. Frustration with their
government flowed much like the Yellow River: starting as a shallow stream, growing into a
river of grievances, and finally cresting over the banks and becoming an unstoppable flood. This
is why it is necessary to examine the flood in its totality. The people of China suffered far more
than what is indicated by the initial casualties that Lary discusses, no matter how groundbreaking
her work seemed.88 The impacts of the Henan Famine of 1942-1943 that writers like Muscolino
and Ritter explore were far more extensive than just the direct suffering incurred.89 EdgertonTarpley perhaps comes closest to capturing the magnitude of this event by focusing on how it
inspired the people to support the CCP in Shantung, but she still leaves out how the famine only
added to their frustration and desperation.90 Chiang’s forces could not recover from the loss in
Shantung and by 1949, they were forced to flee to Taiwan and formed the Republic of China,
while the CCP formed the People’s Republic of China on the mainland. This breach has never
been healed and in that way, the Yellow River’s legacy lives on.
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